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BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Industrial Commission act without or 
in excessf of its authority in awarding death benefits under 
the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Lawf Utah Code 
Ann./ Sections 35-2-1 to Section 35-2-65 because of a lack 
of credible evidence of exposure to asbestos during the 
deceased employee's last employment by the plaintiff? 
2. Assuming some exposure to asbestos during the 
deceased employee's last employment by plaintifff was such 
employment the last injurious exposure to the hazards of 
such disease? 
-1-
3. Are the provisions of Section 35-2-13 and 
Section 35-2-14 unconstitutional under the provisions of 
Article 1, Section XI and Article XVI, Section 5 of the Utah 
Constitution in that the defendant is denied a forum to hear 
her claim because the foregoing statutes of repose limit 
claims to deaths occurring within three years from the last 
day upon which the employee actually worked for the employer 
against whom compensation is claimed and which exposure was 
injurious or harmful? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant agrees with plaintiffs1 statement of 
facts insofar as it is supported by the record of this case. 
In addition to plaintiffs1 statement defendants would add 
the following: 
Mrs. Werner testified that as an officer of Tisco 
she had limited knowledge of the products used by Tisco 
after 1977. It was not the kind used previously but had 
been outlawed, more or less (R. 29). Witness Collins in 
answer to the question, "Would it be fair to say there's 
still some asbestos based material still being used in the 
industry?" answered, "I'd have to say yes to that question" 
(R. 50). Witness Collins also testified that transite pipe 
is still being used, transite sheets are still being used 
which are heavily based in asbestos (R. 51). Witness 
Collins further testified that because transite was commonly 
used in the trade the deceased must have used it (R. 52). 
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Witness Kinder testified that after the ban in 1970 or 1971 
that his use and the deceased's use decreased but that "you 
still could encounter the type of dustf although it would 
not contain asbestos fibers that you've described as occur-
ring in fabrication shops after the ban on asbestos1'(R. 74). 
The only significant portion of the offer of proof relates 
to McOmie alleging that "Tisco has performed demolition type 
work on existing insulated facilities and piping systems and 
would constitute less than 1 per cent of the company's total 
volume" (R. 78). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Defendant contends that the Industrial Commis-
sion of Utah properly awarded occupational disease death 
benefits with some credible evidence of exposure to asbestos 
during the deceased employee's period of employment with the 
employer against whom the award was made. Plaintiff has 
used only the offer of proof as evidence of some exposure 
after 1977. Witness Kinder, who worked with and for de-
ceased , testified that both he and the deceased were exposed 
in fact after the ban and that such exposure was of a 
reduced amount over the exposure in fabrication shops. 
2. Assuming facts that would support a finding of 
exposure to asbestos fibers, the law imposing liability on 
the last employer for whom the deceased was "injuriously 
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exposed to the hazards of the disease" would clearly be 
impossible to achieve. Because of the latency factor in 
peritoneal mesothelioma being at least 15 years and more 
nearly 20, the first exposure is the deadliest—not the 
last. All other cases of occupational disease, i.e., sili-
cosis, silico-tuberculosis, lung cancer caused by ionizing 
radiation, coal worker's pneumoconiosis, to name a few, are 
based upon a presumption that exposure is cumulative and 
that the last exposure is the most harmful. The deceased's 
death warrant was in effect signed 15 to 20 years prior to 
his death. 
3. Sections 35-2-13 and 35-2-14 are unconstitu-
tional on the grounds that these sections deny to the 
defendant an opportunity to be heard on a clearly compens-
ible claim whose exposure was rooted in history—at least 15 
years prior—and was the sole cause of death. Section 
35-2-14 is a statute of repose. The statute of repose 
(35-2-14) runs 30 days after "...the employee was last inju-
riously exposed to the hazards of such disease." All 
medical authorities agree that peritoneal mesothelioma has a 
latency period of at least 15 years. Therefore, the last 
injurious exposure occurred in 1967 that ultimately led to 
the death of the deceased. Section 35-2-13 U.C.A. 1953 
requires "the death must occur within three years from the 
last day upon which the employee actually worked for the 
employer against whom compensation is claimed." Section 
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35-2-14 U.C.A. 1953 provides "the only employer liable shall 
be the employer in whose employment the employee was last 
injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease." 
Section 35-2-48(c) provides a dependent's cause of action 
shall be deemed to arise when the dependent knew the death 
was the result of an occupational disease. The dependents 
here knew the death was occupationally related in 1983 and 
filed a claim promptly against the last employer—plaintiff 
herein. The impossibility of filing against the real respon-
sible party back in 19 67 is apparent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF EXPOSURE TO 
ASBESTOS DURING THE DECEASED EMPLOYEE'S 
LAST PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT WITH THE 
EMPLOYER AGAINST WHOM THE AWARD WAS 
MADE. 
Section 35-2-14 provides the basis upon which the 
liability is chargeable to the last employer by providing in 
part: 
"...the only employer liable shall be the 
employer in whose employment the employee was 
last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such 
disease." (Underscoring added.) 
Plaintiffs argue there was no evidence of record 
and that the Commission relied solely on the offer of proof. 
Such is not the case. 
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Quoting directly from the Denial of Motion For 
Review: 
"In 1971, the Federal Government banned the 
use of asbestos in insulation products. Based on 
testimony adduced at the hearing, the administra-
tive law judge found that the Federal Government 
ban did not necessarily preclude the continued use 
of asbestos products. After the ban, in 1977, the 
deceased formed his own insulation company known 
as Tisco Intermountain" (R. 178). 
All of the witnesses including the widow, Joseph 
Collins and Darrell Kinder testified in accordance with the 
above. The only additional evidence was suggested in the 
offer of proof that McOmie would testify as to demolition 
work in 1981 and 1982 (R. 78). The Commission did not rely 
only on the offer of proof of McOmie, the Commission relied 
on an overall appraisal of the testimony when it found: 
"We find there was sufficient factual testi-
mony to support a finding that the deceased experi-
enced 'some exposure1 to asbestos while employed 
with TISCO" (R. 180). 
Even in dissent Commissioner Hadley opined that 
"...the evidence is too speculative on the issue of last 
injurious exposure, and therefore, the claim must be denied" 
(R. 180). Commissioner Hadley does not make clear as to 
whether the speculative nature of the evidence is directed 
at "injurious" or "some exposure". 
It is respectfully submitted that even medical 
authorities are unsure of an acceptable level of asbestos as 
not being harmful. The medical community and the Federal 
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Government by virtue of the ban on the use of any asbestos 
product would presume that "any exposure" is injurious and 
"harmful". 
POINT II. 
ASSUMING THERE WAS EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS 
DURING THE DECEASED EMPLOYEE'S EMPLOY-
MENT WITH HIS EMPLOYER, BENEFITS WERE 
PROPERLY AWARDED BECAUSE THERE IS NO 
ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF ASBESTOS EXPOSURE 
THAT IS NOT INJURIOUS. 
In the forty-five year existence of the "Utah 
Occupational Disease Disability Law" Sections 35-2-1 to 
35-2-65, U.C.A. 1953, this Supreme Court has addressed opin-
ions on this subject less than twenty times. Not one of 
those opinions has been directed at the terms "harmful," or 
"injurious exposure to the hazards of employment." With two 
exceptions all cases are more than 20 years old. 
Section 35-2-12 U.C.A. 1953 very carefully 
defines: "disablement," "disability," "disabled," and 
"total disability," or "totally disabled," "compensation," 
"award," "Commission" and "partial permanent disability". 
Section 35-2-28 U.C.A. 1953 defines very specifically 
"silicosis". Nowhere in those sections are there any sugges-
tions as to what "harmful" or "injurious exposure" means. 
By far the greatest majority of the cases consid-
ered by this Court has involved "silicosis" or "silico tuber-
culosis" based upon disability or death. The legislative 
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history of the statute—passed in 1941—was designed princi-
pally for the benefit of the silicotic miner. Presumably 
this is why the overwhelming majority of cases involves this 
subject. 
In all of those cases the issue of "injurious 
exposure" or "prolonged inhalation of silicon dioxide dust" 
was never raised. 
The industrial commission seemed to work on a pre-
sumption that if the employee worked in a "hardrock mine" it 
was presumed to have silicon dioxide dust and that the same 
was harmful. Many years ago a local leading medical author-
ity on silicosis testified that the mere presence of 
"silicosis" was sufficient to show the injurious nature of 
the exposure. 
Beginning with Masich v. United States Smelting, 
Refining and Mining Co., 113 U 101, 191 P2d 612, this court 
has held that the act (Utah Occupational Disease Disability 
Law) occupies the complete field of silicosis both as to 
partial as well as total disability. Presumably, the court 
intended all occupational diseases. Naturally the defendant 
is limited to the benefits of this law. 
In Kennecott Copper Corp. (Utah Copper Div.) v. 
Ind. Comm., 115 U 451, 205 P2d 829, the Supreme Court held 
that the law is premised on the concept that if an employee 
is accepted into an employment and performs his work success-
fully for a number of years, and while in such employment 
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finally becomes totally disabled from silicosis, employer in 
whose employment disability occurs should not be permitted 
to exempt himself from liability for total disability by 
asserting that silicosis arose in some prior employment. 
In Uta-Carbon Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission/ 
104 U 567, 140 P2d 649, applying subd. (a)(3) of Section 
35-2-13 U.C.A. 1953, the Supreme Court, after referring to 
the fact that the legislature had not defined what are harm-
ful quantities of silicon dioxide dust, found it was 
apparent that applicant was exposed to harmful quantities of 
such dust in the employ of the company for a period of sixty 
days after effective date of this Act. The case involved a 
"coal miner" engaged in spreading "rock dust" in a coal 
mine. 
In Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 108 U 123, 157 P2d 800, this court ruled that a 
successor carrier was liable even though the disabled miner 
neither had silicosis nor later tuberculosis where it was 
still on the risk when employee was last exposed to harmful 
quantities of silicon dioxide dust. 
All of the foregoing cases simply presume exposure 
and its harmful nature because the employee in fact has sili-
cosis or silico-tuberculosis. At no time was the issue 
raised that the last sixty days were not injurious because 
the miner already had the disease. 
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The medical community and the public health 
officials were not aware of peritoneal mesothelioma and its 
relationship to asbestos fibers until the 1960fs. Because 
of the relationship asbestos had with the development of all 
forms of cancer the federal government banned its further 
manufacture and use in 1971 or 197 2, 
It would be important to quote directly from the 
addendum to the Medical Panel Report of Doctor Lockeyf the 
Medical Panel Chairman. The quote is taken from a paper 
entitled "Asbestos—Effects on Health of Exposure to 
Asbestos" by Richard Doll and Julian Peto: 
"As with other environmentally induced 
cancers, the mean period from first exposure to 
the appearance of the disease is unrelated to the 
intensity of exposure, except insofar as heavy 
exposures shorten the expectation of life and con-
sequently the time during which cancers can occur. 
We cannot, therefore, aim to reduce exposure to 
such an extent that the individual will inevitably 
die of something else before the disease is able 
to appear. Unless, unexpectedly, there turns out 
to be some threshold dose below which asbestos 
does not act as a carcinogen, all we can hope to 
do is reduce the attributable risk at each 
interval after first exposure to such a level that 
the balance of the risk and benefit associated 
with its use is socially acceptable. (Underscor-
ing added.) 
As with lung cancer (and with other cancers 
due to other causes) increasing exposure increases 
the risk of developing the disease, but does not 
affect the length of the induction period. (Under-
scoring added.) 
A progressive reduction in mesothelioma risk 
as a duration of exposure is reduced has also been 
demonstrated in other studies (e.g. Newhouse and 
Berry, 1976; Hobbs et. al. 1980) and this 
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observation deserves special emphasis. For it is 
still widely believed, in spite of consistent 
evidence to the contrary, that very brief asbestos 
exposure necessarily causes a substantial risk of 
mesothelioma" (R. 158). 
The medical authorities above seem to indicate 
that the initial exposure of 15 to 20 years prior is the pre-
cursor of the later developing mesothelioma. As part of 
this theory the latency period or the time required to 
develop a full-blown cancer is 15 years. Continued exposure 
or the intensity of the exposure has little effect on the 
necessary latency period. However, an equally important 
consideration is the removal entirely of any exposure to 
asbestos. 
It must be pointed out that the language of 
Section 35-2-14, supra, provides "...employer in whose 
employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the 
hazards of such disease." It is arguable that a fair inter-
pretation of this section in the instant case would be that 
any exposure of asbestos fiber to the deceased or any other 
employee would be injurious and a hazard potentially in 
creating a mesothelioma 15 years hence. 
The Medical Panel found: 
"Pleural or peritoneal mesotheliomas are 
extremely rare disorders and have been highly 
associated with occupational or other unusual 
exposures to asbestos... 
Increasing intensity of exposure to asbestos 
fibers increases the risk of developing the dis-
ease but does not affect the length of incubation 
period.. . 
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It would appear that continuous exposure 
greater than 20 years would not increase the 
risk of the development of a malignant meso-
thelioma but a reduction in duration of exposure 
has been associated with progressive reduction 
of mesothelioma risk. In theory, a cessation of 
exposure in 1968 may have decreased the risk for 
his development of the malignant mesothelioma." 
Is it not, therefore, arguable that the reduced 
exposure after 1968 may not have been the "main cause" but 
had the exposures been reduced or eliminated, the doctor 
seems to say "the reduction in duration of exposure has 
been associated with progressive reduction of mesothelioma 
risk." 
The subsequent exposure may well have had nothing 
to do with the initiation of the cancer in 19 67 but it may 
well have had something to do with the ultimate creation of 
the fatal lesion in 1983. 
The plaintiff and the commission have quoted from 
Professor Larson as a source in the absence of a court 
decision. 
Defendant would also quote from Professor Larson 
but from the larger work. 
At Section 41.80 Special Occupational Disease 
Restrictions Professor Larson writes: 
"In most states the benefits for occupational 
disease, and the conditions controlling compens-
ability are the same as for other kinds of disabil-
ity. However, in spite of a trend toward aboli-
tion of special restrictions in recent years, 
there remain a significant number of states in 
which special provisions affecting occupational 
diseases, and especially dust diseases, have survived 
and must be reckoned with." 
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Later at Section 41.81 Professor Larson writes: 
"S 41.81 The original reason for these 
restrictions was the fear that the compensation 
system could not bear the financial impact of full 
liability for dust diseases since they were so 
widespread in the industries...some states met 
this transition problem (which to some extent may 
be thought of as a temorary one...) by introducing 
a sliding scale of silicosis benefits which would 
reach full size in a number of years, by barring 
benefits for partial disability, and by throwing 
up a variety of barriers based on relation of time 
or degree of exposure to time of disability, death 
or claim. 
What happened, however, was that these make-
shifts, contrived to tide employers and carriers 
over a transitional difficulty, remained ingrained 
in compensation acts long after their reason for 
existence had diminished or disappeared. 
S. 41.82 Requirements related to time 
between exposure and disability or death, minimum 
period of injurious exposure and the like. 
One of the commonest types of restrictive 
provisions is that which bars claims unless the 
disability or death occurred within a specified 
number of years after a specified event, such as 
the last day of work for the particular employer 
or the last injurious exposure. The arbitrariness 
of these statutes and their exceptions has pro-
duced all kinds of senseless discrimination. 
It is often difficult to understand what some 
of these restrictive provisions were really 
driving at." 
Professor Larson then quotes from the Utah 
Statutes Section 35-2-13 saying "...the two year limitation 
in death cases is replaced by a five-year period if death 
resulted from continuous total disability for which compensa-
tion has been paid or awarded. In one case (Pac. States 
Cast Iron Pipe v. Industrial Commission, supra) death bene-
fits were denied the widow because, although the employee 
had actually applied for compensation during his lifetime, 
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the Commission had never got around to passing on his claim 
before his death. It was conceded that the claim would have 
been granted, but because of non-action beyond the control 
of either the employee or his widow, the literal terms of 
the statute were not fulfilled." 
Note that we are discussing silicosis and in the 
years past strict interpretation of the rules has been 
followed presumably to protect the interests of the employ-
er. The restrictions and limitations within the statute in 
Utah were designed for that purpose. 
Of course defendant prefers the second paragraph 
of Prof. Larson, Section 95.26 (a): "...As long as there 
was some exposure of a kind which could have caused the dis-
ease, the last insurer at risk is liable for all the disabl-
ity from that disease." 
In the case of silicosis, I believe that is the 
current interpretation by the commission and this court. In 
35 years experience in this business I have yet to hear the 
defense of the "injurious nature of the exposure." All 
quoted court decisions and commission decisions imply the 
same rationale, that some exposure is injurious exposure. 
Professor Larson refers to the restrictive limita-
tions on exposure as a protection to the employer. There is 
no real relationship between these restrictions and the 
possible benefit to the rights of the employee. Defendants 
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agree completely that there is no rationale for the term 
"injurious exposure". 
Plaintiffs quote with approval the Scott Company 
v. Workers1 Compensation Appeals Board, 139 Cal. App. 3d 
98f 188 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1983). Plaintiff fails to note the 
nature of the claim. The California Workers Compensation 
Law provides that the Claimant is entitled to benefits from 
all employers who have contributed to his problem. Prop-
erly the court ruled that the claimant was entitled to bene-
fits but the liability could be imposed only on firms which 
actually contributed to the employees in some way. The 
employee was not denied benefits. The dispute existed 
between the employers as to how much each should contribute. 
Unfortunately Utah law is such that there is no 
contribution from prior exposures. As a matter of fact the 
only employer liable under Utah law is the last 
employer. There can be no contribution or claim made 
against prior employers because of the various statutes of 
limitation and statutes of repose preventing access to the 
previous employers. 
The experience of the State Insurance Fund and the 
private insurance companies in losses connected with Occupa-
tional Disease has been so minimal that for many, many years 
a separate premium is not assessed for this coverage. A 
review of the occupational disease claims in the Supreme 
Court bears this out. There have been fewer than twenty 
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appeals in the past forty-five years and no case of signifi-
cance before this court involving either death or total dis-
ability in the past twenty years. 
Here we have a case of admitted liability for 
death benefits from an occupational disease* George Werner 
died, solely because he ingested asbestos fibers in connec-
tion with his employment, and was continuously exposed to 
some asbestos fibers until his death. Plaintiffs defend on 
the nicety that the deceased did not have "injurious 
exposure" of at least thirty days while operating his own 
insulation business. It is respectfully submitted that this 
is in fact a true case to be charged against the insulation 
industry, the asbestos industry and industry generally. 
They are responsible for George Werner's death. 
POINT III. 
SECTION 35-2-13 AND SECTION 35-2-14 ARE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT 
THESE SECTIONS DENY DEFENDANT ACCESS TO 
A FORUM TO HEAR AND DETERMINE HER RIGHTS 
GUARANTEED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF 
ARTICLE I, SECTION II AND ARTICLE XVI, 
SECTION V, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
If the court were to assume the position of the 
plaintiffs herein that the last injurious exposure by the 
deceased was 1967, then the deceased employee would have 
been required to file a claim no later than 1970—this being 
three years after the last exposure. In effect the employer 
at that time would be relieved of all liability. 
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No cause of action arose under our statutes until 
1983, Under the provisions of Section 35-2-48, U.C.A. 1953, 
the dependent's cause of action arose when she knew that the 
death was the result of an occupational disease. 
Section 35-2-48, supra, is a statute of limita-
tion. Section 35-2-14, supra, would appear to be a statute 
of repose. It provides in part "...the only employer liable 
shall be the employer in whose employment the employee was 
last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease." 
Interpreted strictly this relieves Tisco because 
the exposure was not injurious and the exposure must go back 
to the last "injurious exposure." Plaintiff's interpreta-
tion would move the last injurious exposure to 1967, when 
the mesothelioma began to develop. Since the deceased 
neither knew that he was "injuriously exposed" nor in fact 
could have been diagnosed as having mesothelioma, he filed 
no claim. The insidious part about this grievous medical 
problem is that it cannot be diagnosed until it is terminal 
or fatal. 
By virtue of a strict application of these restric-
tive employer-oriented statutory defenses in silicosis 
cases, the widow is denied the opportunity to assert an 
Occupational Disease claim. 
The Supreme Court's recent decision on Mark Berry 
et. al. v. Beech Aircraft Corp. et. al., 25 Utah Adv. Rep. 
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30, No. 17694, has a significant bearing on the issues in 
this case. 
The court said: 
"Statutes of repose, such as Section 3 of the 
Products Liability Act are different from statutes 
of limitations, although to some extent they serve 
the same ends... 
Once a cause of action arises, a statute of 
limitations requires a lawsuit to be filed within 
a specified period of time after the injury or the 
remedy for the wrong committed is deemed waived. 
A statute of repose bars all actions after the 
statutory period of time has elapsed. The repose 
period, however, begins to run from the occurrence 
of some event other than the occurrence of the 
injury that gives rise to the cause of action. 
Since the statute of repose begins to run 
from a date unrelated to the date of an injury, it 
is not therefore designed to allow a reasonable 
term for the filing of an action once it arises. 
Thus, a statute of repose may bar the filing of a 
lawsuit even though the cause of action did not 
even arise until after it was barred...Thus 
Section 3 of the Utah Product Liability Act bars 
actions without regard to when an injury occurs 
and is not designed to provide a reasonable time 
within which to file a lawsuit. Indeed, a statute 
of repose may cut off a cause of action even 
though it is filed within the period allowed by 
the relevant statute of limitations." 
Applied to the instant case, it appears that the 
last injurious exposure provision is clearly intended as a 
statute of repose. Here, admittedly, the last injurious, 
harmful and sole contributing cause for the death of the 
deceased occurred in 1967. The statute of limitations would 
run in three years or 1970. But the cause of action arose in 
1983 at the death of George Werner. 
The court said further in Berry: 
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"Indeed, long delayed health hazards from 
prescription drugs such as DES (which may cause 
cancer in the daughters of patients who have taken 
that drug) , and chemicals such as asbestos and 
vinyl chloride can cause death many years after 
exposure. See e.g., Mathis v. Ely Lily and Co., 
719 F2d 134 (6th Circuit 1983). (Plaintiff sued 
for damages for cervical cancer which developed in 
1980 apparently from mothers ingestion of DES in 
1955); Karjala v. Johns Manville Products Corp., 
523 F2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975) (asbestos dust)." 
Article I, Section II, provides: 
"All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done him in his person, property, or 
reputation shall have a remedy by due course of 
law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal 
in this state, by himself or counsel any civil 
course to which he is a party." 
This court also in the Berry (supra) case, in 
reference to this provision, writes': 
"Defining the scope of the constitutional 
protection that Section II affords individual 
substantive rights is a task of the utmost deli-
cacy and requires a careful consideration of other 
important, and sometimes competing, constitutional 
interests. 
"Article XVI, Section V: Wrongful Death." 
"The right of action to recover damages for 
injuries resulting in death, shall never be abro-
gated, and the amount recoverable shall not be 
subject to any statutory limitation, except in 
cases where compensation for injuries resulting in 
death is provided for by law." 
Article XVI, Section V, was amended in 19 20 to add 
the last phrase providing for workers1 compensation death 
benefits. By virtue of this Amendment the workers' compensa-
tion laws have been deemed constitutional. 
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In the instant case, with the law in effect that 
the "last injurious exposure to the hazards of employment" 
occurred in 1967, this claim would be denied before the 
cause of action arose, (Underscoring added.) The widow 
would be denied death benefits under the Occupational Dis-
ease Disability Law and would be prevented from a wrongful 
death suit because of the exclusive remedy provision under 
Section 35-2-3. 
The employer provided not only the dangerous 
material but also provided the hazardous environment worked 
in by the deceased. Truly, the real responsible party is 
held immune from suit or claim and the widow is denied bene-
fits to which she is properly entitled. 
Professor Larson, Workmens Compensation Law at 
Section 41.81 discussed the problem of special occupational 
disease restrictions as it applied to the Michigan law. 
Michigan's law was very restrictive at the outset. As time 
went by the need for such restrictions became not only less 
apparent but virtually nil. Professor Larson writes: 
"The persistence of this unsatisfactory situa-
tion led to a dramatic attempt in Michigan to have 
the special statutory limits on silicosis benefits 
struck down as unconstitutional. The essence of 
the claimant1s argument—a theory with fascinating 
implications for constitutional law in general— 
was that a statute which might have been constitu-
tional when passed could become unconstitutional 
by the disappearance of the conditions whose exis-
tence had made the original enactment constitu-
tional... The claimant argued that the maximum 
limit of $6,000 for silicotic disability created 
an arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory 
classification under the 14th Amendment The 
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court, although sympathetic toward the claim, held 
that it was beyond the power of the court to apply 
this reasoning to the instant case because at the 
time the decedent1s rights accrued the classifica-
tion was not obsolete. It is interesting that the 
court apparently did not rule out the possibility 
of reconsidering this line of attack in some 
future case in which the evidence would be 
stronger on obsolescence. The Supreme Court of 
Michigan said: 
"Any argument that the scheme is now 
obsolete as to future disabilities must 
wait consideration on a record which 
presents some facts from which it might 
be deducted that the legislative reason-
ing had lost all value with the passage 
of time and change of circumstances. 
(104 N.W. 2d 182 at p. 188)•" 
It is respectfully submitted that the phrase 
"...last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease" 
is obsolete and wholly discriminatory in the light of modern 
day medical technology and its ability to determine the 
original causes of occupational diseases and disability. 
CONCLUSION 
Using the industrial commission's findings of 
"some" exposure and applying the same to the long-
established practice of considering any exposure as suffi-
cient to meet the qualifications of Sections 35-2-4, the 
Award of the Industrial Commission should be sustained. 
Alternatively, out of consideration of the consti-
tutional enigma presented by Section 35-2-4, the same should 
be struck down as obsolete and unconstitutional in denying 
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this Defendant an opportunity to have her rights determined 
for death benefits, 
DATED this day of February, 1986. 
ROBERT J. SHAUGHNESSY, 
Attorney for Defendants 
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